
“This course contains the use of artificial intelligence.”
A High-impact system is a different job. Under FISMA and FIPS 200 there are no waivers: if a system is categorized High under FIPS 199, every applicable control in the SP 800-53 Rev. 5 High baseline has to be implemented, and an assessor will ask you to prove it. This bootcamp is about doing exactly that on a real system, control family by control family, and leaving behind the evidence an assessor can parse.
You start by measuring the baseline yourself. You load NIST's official OSCAL catalog and the Low, Moderate and High profiles (version 5.2.0), count the items — 149, 287 and 370 — identify the 83 items that only High adds, and tailor the profile with organization-defined parameters into a machine-readable control list. Then you build the lab: a three-tier reference system (web, app, database) in containers plus an Ubuntu 24.04 VM for the kernel-level controls, OpenSCAP with the SCAP Security Guide, Wazuh and OpenSearch for monitoring, and a Git evidence locker organised by control family.
From there the course walks the technical families and implements them for real. Access Control: account lifecycle, automated disablement, separation of duties, sudo least privilege, concurrent session limits, nftables tier-to-tier flows and hardened SSH. Identification and Authentication: unique IDs, TOTP multifactor, password quality and SSH key rotation. Audit and Accountability: auditd rules, time-correlated trails with chrony, off-host shipping over TLS, signed archives, non-repudiation and retention. Configuration Management: baselines as code, STIG remediation with Ansible, scheduled compliance scans committed to Git, change gates, least functionality, allow-listing and live inventory.
The System and Communications Protection family covers boundaries, isolation, fail-secure behaviour, TLS 1.2 and 1.3 only, key management, encryption at rest and the FIPS 140-3 transition, including what FIPS mode does and does not prove. System and Information Integrity, Risk Assessment, Contingency Planning and Incident Response are built the same way: AIDE with automated response, ClamAV reporting into Wazuh, Trivy image scans, a ranked risk register, encrypted backups with a timed restore drill, and an incident timeline generated from audit and Wazuh data.
Two sections take the controls onto modern substrates: a container platform (dropped capabilities, segmented networks, a deployment gate that refuses unsigned images, Cosign signatures and SBOMs with Syft) and infrastructure as code (Terraform plans, policy-as-code checks, drift detection). The families you cannot script — PE, PS, MA, MP, AT, PL, PM and PT — get an owner and an evidence type each, so nothing is left as an unowned paragraph.
The last sections are about proving it: continuous monitoring jobs that scan, compare and report; assessment results files; POA&M entries generated from failed checks; and a System Security Plan authored in OSCAL with compliance-trestle, validated against the schema and linked to the evidence locker. A capstone rebuilds the reference system from zero, applies the hardened baseline, and assembles the whole authorization package the way an assessor would walk it.
This is a defensive, implementation-first course. Every control ID and baseline count comes from the NIST OSCAL content, not from memory; STIG results are pivoted to 800-53 through each rule's NIST reference, and the course says plainly where a clean scan stops covering the baseline. There are no attack labs, no licensed consoles and no statistics. The course produces implementations and evidence; authorization remains a risk decision made by an authorizing official, and nothing here is legal advice. Eleven downloadable documents come with the course, including the lab bundle handbook, the High baseline quick reference, the FIPS 199 categorization worksheet, the tailoring and parameter decision record, the evidence locker standard, the technical controls checklist, the recovery and IR exercise workbook, the supply-chain and IaC checklist, the non-technical families owner matrix and the continuous monitoring, POA&M and OSCAL SSP build guide.